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I. INTRODUCTION
Just past midnight, four Cubans walked off the beach in the dark and
began to wade through warm waves out into the Florida Straits.1 They
walked nearly a mile in waist-high water, carrying all of their possessions
above their heads. They knew to stop when they heard the mile-marker
bobbing in the water. Fidgeting and nervous, they waited there for hours
afraid that they would be discovered by Cuban patrols or sharks. Finally,
they could see the navigational lights of a fast-boat approaching. Twentynine other refugees were already aboard the boat and shifted to make room
for them. Together, they lay huddled on the deck, praying that the vessel
would go undetected by the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard).
The successful smuggling expedition ended shortly after dawn, when
the passengers walked ashore onto a Key Largo, Florida beach.2 The group
immediately sought out an immigration official and identified themselves
as Cuban nationals. After receiving a meal and undergoing inspection
according to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, the refugees were
paroled3 into the United States by the end of the day. If the refugees were
of any other nationality, or had in fact been interdicted at sea by the Coast
Guard, they would have been repatriated immediately.
More appealing than the fabled sirens‘ song, the Cuban Adjustment
Act (CAA) continues to call Cubans out to sea with the promise of ―no
questions asked‖ political asylum for those who reach the United States. In
1994, the CAA was modified by the counter-intuitive ―Wet Foot/Dry Foot‖
policy, which reserves the preferential protections of the CAA for only
those ―dry foot‖ Cubans who reach United States soil. In contrast, the
Coast Guard repatriates ―wet foot‖ Cubans discovered at sea. Because
those interdicted at sea are generally no less deserving of the safeguard of
the CAA than those arriving undetected on shore, the Wet Foot/Dry Foot
policy is essentially a tool to circumvent the automatic award of asylum
under the CAA. Worse still, the policy incites smuggling by rewarding
those who are able to evade the Coast Guard and make landfall but
repatriating those discovered in transit. In addition to incentivizing
smuggling, the contradiction of the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy
creates both actus reus and mens rea defenses to the crime of smuggling a
Cuban national. Notwithstanding immigration issues, the CAA creates a
national security loophole, whereby terrorists might enter into and remain
in the United States.
1. This scenario is based on the story of Cuban refugee Miakiel Gonzalez, as reported on
HavanaTimes.org. Kelly Knaub, The Cuban Adjustment Act 44 Years Later, HAVANA TIMES, May
15, 2010, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=24150.
2. In the article, Gonzalez indicates that he was first taken to Mexico and then walked across
the United States-Mexico border. Id. However, many cases demonstrate that the Florida Keys are a
more typical smuggling destination. See United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 620 (11th
Cir. 2010) (Loggerhead Key, Florida); United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006)
(southwestern Miami-Dade County, Florida); United States v. Zaldivar, 615 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2010) (Key Largo, Florida).
3. For a description of the parole function, see discussion infra Part III.A.
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This Note analyzes the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy and
assesses whether the justifications for enactment support the continuation
of the policies today. Part II describes the history of United States-Cuban
relations. Part III traces the evolution of United States-Cuban migration
policy, including the enactment of the CAA and the signing of the 1994
Joint Communiqué, which gave rise to the current Wet Foot/Dry Foot
policy. Part IV details how these policies incentivize smuggling. Part V
demonstrates how together these policies create defenses to the crime of
smuggling a Cuban citizen and examines whether Congress intended for
such a result in drafting the smuggling statute. Part VI recounts the
historical justifications for the CAA and considers whether these
justifications have any place in modern United States-Cuban policy.
Finding that the historical justifications do not outweigh the smuggling and
national security issues created by the CAA, Part VII advocates for the
repeal of the Act. This Note concludes that the CAA is no longer utilitarian
and should be repealed in favor of a more pragmatic approach wherein
Cubans migrate only through proper immigration channels.4
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
The relationship between Cuba and the United States spans just over
one hundred years. In 1898, American soldiers liberated Cuba from
Spanish colonialism.5 For the next four years, the United States military
continued to occupy Cuba.6 In 1903, the United States acquired the
infamous Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.7 The perpetual military presence
on the island made it easy for the United States to meddle in Cuban
politics, invading Cuba in the years 1906–1909, 1912, and 1917–1923.8 It
was with the blessing of the American government that Fulgencio Batista
seized power in 1933.9 Batista won the Cuban presidency in 1940 and
ruled until 1958, years which many Cubans consider a period of Cuban
―democracy.‖10 Then, in 1959, there was revolution. Fidel Castro ousted
Batista, bringing communism to Cuba.11
It was Cuba‘s wealthy who first abandoned the new communist state.12
Between 1959 and 1962, an estimated 248,070 Cubans fled the country.13
The majority of these refugees were well-educated citizens, many of them
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
5. REESE ERLICH, DATELINE HAVANA: THE REAL STORY OF U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF
CUBA 17 (2009).
6. Id. at 17.
7. Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’
Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 326–27
(2001).
8. ERLICH, supra note 5, at 19.
9. Id. at 19–20.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 20–21.
12. MARÍA CRISTINA GARCÍA, HAVANA USA 13 (1996).
13. Id.
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doctors, lawyers, and professors.14 Their exodus resulted in a ―brain drain‖
on the Cuban workforce.
Shortly thereafter, rumors began to circulate the island that the new
government intended to ―nationalize‖ school children by sending them to
the Soviet Union for ―communist indoctrination.‖15 Frantic Cuban parents
unable to obtain exit visas placed their children on commercial flights from
Havana to Miami through ―Operation Pedro Pan,‖ ultimately sending
14,048 Cuban children stateside.16 The second great influx of immigrants
occurred from 1962 to 1965, when many of those children‘s families were
able to join them in the United States.17
Desperate to prevent the spread of communism throughout the Western
hemisphere, the United States government developed a policy to aid antiCastro guerilla forces.18 In 1960, the CIA began recruiting and training
Cuban exiles to overthrow the Cuban government.19 One year later, the
trained refugees invaded southern Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in a covert
American-supported operation.20 The would-be heroes were defeated two
days later.21 It was a victory for communism, but a narrow one. The
Soviets acted quickly to bolster Cuba by sending military artillery,
including nuclear missiles.22
Fearing the nuclear threat, the Kennedy Administration suspended all
flights to and from Cuba.23 Castro retaliated in a speech on September 29,
14. More than two-thirds of the University of Havana faculty immigrated to Miami by 1961.
Id. at 28. The influx of lawyers was such that, in 1973, the University of Florida designed an
eighteen-month program that enabled Cuban attorneys to graduate expeditiously with an American
law degree. Id.
15. Yvonne A. Tamayo, Cubans Without Borders: Finding Home, 55 FLA. L. REV. 215, 221
(2003).
16. Id.
17. An estimated 74,000 Cubans entered the United States from 1962 to 1965. Roland
Estevez, Note, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and Helms-Burton:
Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2002). For an account of ―Operation
Pedro Pan‖ by one who traveled to the United States as part of the program, see generally Francisco
Valdes, Diaspora and Deadlock, Miami and Havana: Coming to Terms with Dreams and Dogmas,
55 FLA. L. REV. 283, 284–85 (2003) (recounting his travel from Cuba to an orphanage in Pueblo,
Colorado and eventual reunion with his family in Miami).
18. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 30–31.
19. Id. (―The CIA recruited close to fifteen hundred exiles to take part in the invasion force—
or Brigade 2506, as the regiment came to be known—and over the next year trained these men at
secret bases in Panama, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.‖).
20. Id.
21. Id. For a more detailed account of the ―fiasco‖ at the Bay of Pigs, see generally id. at 30–
35.
22. Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ¿Mirando por los Ojos de Don Quijote o
Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 903–04 (2001).
23. Id. at 904. Though the general ban on travel to Cuba is still in force, President Barack
Obama lifted the ban on family travel into Cuba in 2009. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS 27 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40193.pdf. There are now ―no limitations on the frequency or
duration of family visits.‖ Id. President Obama is expected to make travel even less restrictive in the
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1965, by announcing to Cuban citizens with relatives in the United States
that their American relatives were free to retrieve them from the shores of
Cuba without penalty.24 That October, a flotilla from Miami descended
upon Cuba to carry hordes of new immigrants to the United States.25
Within months, the number of Cuban exiles residing in the United States
nearly doubled from 211,000 to 411,000.26 At first, the United States coped
sufficiently with the influx of refugees.27 But when the boatlift gained
momentum, the administration realized the need for an orderly
immigration procedure. By November of 1965, Cuban and American
officials settled on United States funded air transportation for Cuban
citizens immigrating to Florida.28 These ―freedom flights‖ carried almost
300,000 Cubans to Miami in what is still the ―largest airborne refugee
operation in American history.‖29 In response to the prolific number of
Cubans coming over in the ―lifts,‖ Congress enacted the CAA in 1966.30
Over time, the preferential CAA would become the albatross of U.S.near future. Id.
24. During the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution at the Plaza de la Revolución, Castro addressed the crowd, using the occasion to ―laugh
a little at [his] enemies‖:
[T]he imperialists are making a campaign with those who go, when it is they who
close all the ways. . . .
....
. . . . It is said that we machinegun those that want to go and that we do horrible
things against them. Well, we must put an end to this once and for all. How? Well,
we think that there is a good method. It is not we who are opposed to the departure
of those who want to go, but the imperialists, and since this is the fact, we are even
ready to fix up a little place somewhere so that all who have relatives here will not
have to run any risks, will not have to expose their relatives to any kind of risk.
Premier Fidel Castro, Live Speech at Ceremonies Marking Fifth Anniversary of the CDR (Sept. 29,
1965) (transcript available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1965/19650929.html).
25. Note, supra note 22, at 904.
26. Id.
27. Id. In a speech on October 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared, ―[T]o the
people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here in America will find it. . . . [W]e Americans will
welcome these Cuban people.‖ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the
Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York (Oct. 3, 1965), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/651003.asp. President Johnson
used the Attorney General‘s parole authority, designed to allow for temporary admission of aliens,
to allow the Cubans immediate legal entry into the United States. See Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical
Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 870–71 (1982).
28. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 38.
29. Note, supra note 22, at 905 & n.22. By the time Castro finally ended the freedom flights
in April 1973, ―3,048 flights had carried 297,318 refugees to the United States.‖ GARCÍA, supra
note 12, at 43.
30. Note, supra note 22, at 905.
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Cuban policy.
III. EVOLUTION OF CUBAN-AMERICAN MIGRATION POLICY
Under the United States Constitution, Congress enjoys plenary
authority to establish and enforce immigration policy.31 With this authority,
Congress provides refugees with two options to establish permanent
residence in the United States: refugee programs in the applicants‘ home
countries or political asylum once inside the United States.32 Refugee
programs are conducted entirely overseas, with the applicant submitting a
petition for admission that demonstrates a ―‗well-founded fear of
persecution.‘‖33 If the petition is approved, the applicant ―may enter the
United States through one of the admission slots set aside for refugees
from [their] region of the world.‖34 For example, the United States has
promised to accept at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year through
legal immigration channels.35
Refugees already present in the United States may file an application
for political asylum to prevent deportation but must likewise show a ―wellfounded fear of persecution.‖36 However, as one article points out, that
claim is extremely difficult to demonstrate, and applicants are successful
only 15%–30% of the time.37 But there is a loophole for Cubans. The
protection of the CAA allows Cuban nationals to remain in the United
States without applying for political asylum, a ―preferential treatment‖ not
afforded to any other nationality.38
A. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966
The CAA originated as a coping mechanism for the inordinate influx of
Cuban immigrants in the 1960s. Prior to 1966, the majority of Cubans who
entered the United States came without virtue of visas, background checks,
or employment authorizations.39 Once within the United States, the process
of obtaining an immigrant visa became a near impossible feat.40 Cubans
seeking permanent United States residency, like all other nationalities,
were required to leave the United States and apply for an immigration visa
31. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
32. Id. at 905–06.
33. Id. at 906 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2006)).
34. Id.; see also U.S.-Cuba Joint Communiqué on Migration, Sept. 9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327,
330 [hereinafter Joint Communiqué] (indicating the number of spots allocated for Cuban
immigrants).
35. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 330.
36. Note, supra note 22, at 906.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 906–07.
39. John Scanlan & Gilburt Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee
Flow from Cuba, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 118 (1983).
40. Javier Talamo, Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act: A Law Under Siege?, 8 ILSA J. INT‘L &
COMP. L. 707, 709–10 (2002).
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at a United States consulate.41 Only after obtaining the immigrant visa
could a Cuban return to the United States as a permanent resident, able to
legally work and enroll in school.42 Congress, at least with respect to
Cuban immigrants, found this process unjust because it created a ―great
personal hardship to, and impose[d] financial burdens upon, people who
are already impoverished by force or circumstances.‖43
In an effort to hasten the resettlement of the ever increasing,
unemployable Cuban population, Congress drafted the Cuban Refugee Act,
later called the Cuban Adjustment Act.44 The CAA essentially alters
immigration practice and procedure for Cubans alone. Typically, an alien45
who enters the United States without being inspected and admitted or
paroled46 by an immigration officer47 and who is later discovered is subject
to immediate removal or detention pending formal removal proceedings.48
Parole is intended as a ―temporary, unofficial entry into the United
States pending the resolution of [an] application[].‖49 However, parole for
41. Id. at 709 (citing H.R. REP. 89-1978, at 3793–94 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3792).
42. Id. at 709–10.
43. H.R. REP. 89-1978, at 3798 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792.
44. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255n (2006)). The Act was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976. Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 9, 90 Stat. 2703, 2707 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006)).
45. ―Alien‖ is defined as ―any person not a citizen or national of the United States.‖ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006).
46. Rather than instituting removal proceedings, the Attorney General may:
[I]n his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States,
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and
when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General,
have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody
from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with
in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006). For a fuller discussion of parole and adjustment of status, see
generally Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—Regulating Away Alien
Eligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound Immigration
Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV 713, 718–20 (2006).
47. An alien who is not admitted is deemed an ―applicant for admission.‖ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1) (2006).
48. ―An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives
in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible.‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i). However, no alien will be returned to his country of
origin if the United States does not have ―full diplomatic relations‖ with that country. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(F).
49. Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds sub
nom Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
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Cubans means something quite unique because the CAA gives the
Attorney General the discretion to award permanent residency to any
Cuban who is paroled into and physically present for one year in the United
States.50 It is perhaps disingenuous to say that the Attorney General ―has
discretion‖ because, in fact, ―[m]ost of the undocumented Cubans who
arrive in the United States are allowed to stay and adjust to permanent
resident status under the [CAA].‖51 Therefore, once stateside, Cubans
typically remain in the United States permanently.
In practice, a Cuban entering the United States is ordinarily inspected
and paroled within the same day.52 Thereafter, the Cuban will enjoy the
majority of benefits reserved for citizens, including permission to work
within the United States and access to government-provided healthcare.53
After two years of residence in the United States, the Cuban may apply for
an adjustment of status to that of permanent residence.54 This is a privilege
afforded to no other nationality and has been understood ―by generations of
Cuban-Americans and many politicians to be an open-ended entitlement
[to permanent residence] for all Cubans . . . .‖55
B. The Mariel Boatlift and the Joint Communiqué of 1994
During the late 1970s, Cubans desperate to leave the island began
hijacking boats in order to make landfall in Florida where they would

50. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)). The Act reads:
That notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who
has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to
January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least
[one year], may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under
such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the
alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States
for permanent residence.
Id.
51. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES:
POLICY & TRENDS 2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf.
52. Telephone interview with the Honorable Keith Williams, retired Immigration Judge (Nov.
3, 2010). If a Cuban alien is deemed inadmissible, typically because of a criminal record, the alien
is given a ―supervisory order‖ and paroled into the United States just the same. Id. This is because
the United States has no diplomatic relationship with Cuba. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F).
53. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Keith Williams, supra note 52; see also WASEM,
supra note 51, at 6–8.
54. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255n (2006)).
55. Note, supra note 22, at 907 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted). See
generally id. at 907 (noting that Cubans who ―arrived on American soil [were] in effect guaranteed
permanent-resident status‖).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/6

8

Reynolds: Irreconcilable Regulations: Why the Sun Has Set on the Cuban Adju

2011]

IRRECONCILABLE REGULATIONS

1021

immediately be paroled into the United States.56 Following the hijackings,
there were several attempts by asylum-seeking Cubans to force their way
into Latin American embassies. In March of 1980, six frustrated Cubans
drove a bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, Cuba.57
When this public unrest finally threatened the stability of the Cuban
government, Castro used immigration to rid the island of malcontents and
simultaneously wage war with Washington.58
Castro felt that the United States government encouraged such political
dissention with an open immigration policy and its failure to publicly
admonish the dissidents for their illegal acts.59 He responded by sending
the United States all the Cubans it could handle. On his orders, the Cuban
government opened the port of Mariel, and Castro invited his exiles to
return for their relatives.60 Between April 1980 and October 1980, nearly
125,000 Cubans were picked up on the shores of Cuba and brought by boat
to the United States in what became known as the ―Mariel Boatlift.‖61 The
Carter administration welcomed this ―Freedom Flotilla‖62 to America with
―open hearts and open arms.‖63
If Castro thought he could rid himself of the troublemakers in one mass
exodus, he was much mistaken. In 1994, food shortages, electrical
blackouts, and government attempts to stop defection led to massive antiCastro demonstrations.64 Castro allayed the rioters this time by allowing
those who wanted to leave Cuba to do so freely, with no threat of
interdiction by Cuban authorities or ―illegal exit‖ penalties.65
Approximately 25,000 refugees left the shores of Cuba in the summer of
1994, many floating away on makeshift rafts.66 But unlike the Mariel
Cubans, these migrants were not embraced with President Carter‘s open
arms—they were instead pushed away by the Clinton administration.67 On
August 18, 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced from the White
56. See LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES AND
354 (2009).
57. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 55.
58. Id. at 54.
59. SCHOULTZ, supra note 56, at 354 (―The United States ‗encourages illegal departures from
Cuba, the hijacking of boats, and it receives the hijackers almost as if they were heroes‘ . . . .‖
(quoting Fidel Castro)).
60. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 46.
61. Id. During this period, the Coast Guard rescued 124,776 Cuban refugees at sea and
brought them into the United States. Mariel Boatlift, U.S. COAST GUARD,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/mariel.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
62. The participants of the Mariel Boatlift were often described as the ―Freedom Flotilla.‖ See
United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring).
63. FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 83
(1996) (quoting President Jimmy Carter).
64. Donald Brown, Comment, Crooked Straits: Maritime Smuggling of Humans from Cuba
to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2002).
65. Talamo, supra note 40, at 713.
66. Note, supra note 22, at 907.
67. Id.
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
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House press room that new measures would be taken to stop the rafters.68
Without exception, the Coast Guard would collect immigrants found at sea
and deliver them to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.69 It was important that
the Cubans not reach United States soil where they would be entitled to the
protection of the CAA.70
This was because the Clinton Administration, tired of being bombarded
with Castro‘s castoffs, refused to take in more Cubans.71 Castro could not
have been happier. For years, Castro had urged the United States
government to repeal the CAA, insisting that the Act was a ―murderous‖
and ―terrorist‖ law.72 In September 1994, Clinton and Castro came together
68. ROBERTO SURO, STRANGERS AMONG US: HOW LATINO IMMIGRATION IS TRANSFORMING
AMERICA 27 (1998). President Bill Clinton met with a delegation of Cuban-American leaders to
persuade them to endorse his new internment policy. Id. at 172. Clinton worried about mass
demonstrations or interference with Coast Guard actions from Miami Cubans. Id. at 173. Among
the group was Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban-American Foundation. Mas Canosa gave his
blessing to the policy, effectively approving the end of thirty-five years of preferential treatment for
Cubans. Id. In fact, Miami Cubans as a whole barely objected at all. Id.
69. Talamo, supra note 40, at 713.
70. The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is not United States territory. See Cuban Am. Bar
Ass‘n. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424–25 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing the status of
Guantanamo Bay).
71. In a speech on June 27, 1995, President Clinton declared:
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come here. We cannot let people
risk their lives on open seas in unseaworthy rafts. . . .
....
Regularizing Cuban migration also helps our efforts to promote a peaceful
transition to democracy on the island. For too long, Castro has used the threats of
uncontrolled migration to distract us from this fundamental objective. With the
steps I have taken, we are now able to devote ourselves fully to our real, long-term
goal.
William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks to the Cuban-American Community (June 27, 1995),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51547&st=&st1=#axzz1Lsormmak.
72. Fidel Castro, Address at Mass Rally in the ―José Martí‖ Anti-Imperialist Square, City of
Havana 12 (Nov. 27, 2001) (transcript available in the University of Florida Library West).
Responding to the death of thirty Cubans attempting to immigrate to the United States via a
smuggler‘s fast-boat, Castro told his ―compatriots‖:
For many years we have been advising the U.S. Administrations that the
Cuban Adjustment Act, in force since November 2, 1966, and the incentives to
illegal migration are the cause of great hazards and take a high toll in human lives.
....
The Cuban Adjustment Act is not only a murderous law but it is also a
terrorist law, one that fosters the worst kind of terrorism since it deliberately and
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to carve out an exception to the CAA in a bilateral migration agreement
dubbed the Joint Communiqué.73 The Joint Communiqué states that Cuban
―migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will not be
permitted to enter the United States . . . .‖74 This language has become
known as the ―Wet Foot/Dry Foot‖ policy, so coined because the policy
rewards those Cuban refugees who reach American soil (those with ―dry
feet‖) with adjustment under the CAA but calls for the repatriation of those
interdicted at sea (those with ―wet feet‖).75 In effect, the Wet Foot/Dry
Foot policy circumvents the deliverance of the CAA by preventing wouldbe applicants who do not reach United States soil from completing the first
requirement: to be inspected and paroled into the United States.76
C. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act & the
Meissner Memorandum
The Clinton Administration went even further to alter migration policy.
In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRA).77 Under IIRA, ―An alien present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in
the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General, is inadmissible.‖78 The Act created confusion among
immigration officials as to whether Cubans entering the United States at a
place other than a designated port (as was often the case) were
―inadmissible‖ and therefore, not entitled to an adjustment of status under
the CAA.79 Many speculated that IIRA amounted to President Clinton‘s de
facto repeal of the CAA.
Doris Meissner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
Commissioner, was not prepared to let the CAA fall by the wayside. In
April 1999, Meissner issued a memorandum clarifying eligibility for
permanent residence under the CAA despite having arrived at a place other
than a designated port.80 The memorandum reads, in pertinent part:

remorselessly kills innocent children.
Id. at 2, 12.
73. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 329.
74. Id.
75. Note, supra note 22, at 907.
76. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).
77. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006).
79. Talamo, supra note 40, at 718.
80. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm‘r, Eligibility for Permanent Residence
Despite Having Arrived at a Place Other than a Designated Port (Apr. 19, 1999), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-26005/0-0-0-31369.html
[hereinafter Meissner Memorandum].
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The policy of the [INS] is that the inadmissibility ground
that is based on an alien‘s having arrived at a place other than
a port of entry does not apply to CAA applicants. All [INS]
officers adjudicating CAA applications will do so in
accordance with this policy. So long as the applicant meets all
other CAA eligibility requirements, it is contrary to this
policy to find the alien ineligible for CAA adjustment on the
basis of the alien‘s having arrived in the United States at a
place other than a designated port of entry.81
In her memorandum, Meissner indicated that a finding of
inadmissibility would be contrary to legislative intent and noted that the
United States government had in fact ―recently reaffirmed the availability
of this adjustment provision, by enacting that the CAA is to continue in
force until there is a democratic government in Cuba.‖82 Indeed, the
privileges of the CAA remain intact today.
IV. SMUGGLING AN ILLEGAL ALIEN
Despite travel restrictions imposed by both the Cuban and United
States governments, Cuba is one of the top five ―immigrant-sending‖
countries.83 Immigration has increased since 1995.84 In fiscal year 2008
alone, nearly 50,000 Cubans became legal permanent residents of the
United States.85 Currently, Cuban nationals may legally migrate to the
United States through (1) the issuance of an immigrant visa; (2) admission
as a political refugee; (3) winning the diversity lottery; or (4) selection
through the Special Cuban Migration Program, generally known as the
Cuban lottery.86 For those who will not wait their turn, there is yet another
way to the United States: a clandestine boat ride through the Florida
Straits.
The immediacy of the CAA continues to lure Cubans to the coast of
Florida.87 And because current United States policy requires ―dry feet‖ for
a shot at the good life, smuggling88 has emerged as the only feasible
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 606(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-695).
83. WASEM, supra note 51, at 15. The other top five countries in 2008 were Mexico, China,
India, and the Philippines. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Fact Sheet: The Cuban Adjustment Act, U.S. DEP‘T. OF STATE (Mar. 16, 2000),
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/cuba_adjustment_act.html. For a more thorough
discussion of legal methods of migration, see id.
87. For current statistics on the rate of Cuban migrant interdiction at sea, see United States
Coast Guard‘s Web site. Alien Migrant Interdiction Statistics, U.S. COAST GUARD,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp (last updated Apr. 5, 2011).
88. The Eleventh Circuit defines smuggling as ―‗bringing into or tak[ing] out of a country
[]merchandise, forbidden articles, or persons contrary to law and with a fraudulent intent . . . .‘‖
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting WEBSTER‘S
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method of migration for many.89 To illuminate, 13,019 Cubans arrived at
ports of entry without documents in fiscal year 2007.90 The Coast Guard
was able to intercept another 2,868 Cubans before they reached land.91 An
untold number entered the country at a place other than a designated port
of entry. Immigration policy specialist Ruth Wasem has observed that of
the 49,000 Cubans who became legal United States residents in 2008,
―very few . . . arrived in the United States through the legal immigration
avenues proscribed by the [Immigration and Nationality Act].‖92
A. Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy Incentivizes Smuggling
A survey of recent case law demonstrates the technicality of current
policy and the practicality in employing the assistance of a professional
smuggler to enter the United States with truly ―dry feet.‖ For example, as
noted by Javier Talamo in 1999, the Miami Herald reported that the Coast
Guard apprehended three Cuban refugees in Key Largo, Florida, but only
one was permitted to stay in the country.93 This is because of the three,
only one Cuban landed on the beach.94 The other two were taken into
custody while walking in the surf some 100 yards off shore.95 Technically,
they were each standing on United States soil, but the two with ―wet feet‖
were prevented from coming ashore.96 The reporter interviewed an INS
spokesman who defended the decision to repatriate the ―wet foot‖ Cubans
stating, ―‗Everybody knows you have to make landfall,‘ . . . . ‗There are
unique circumstances around every landing. . . The strict interpretation of
the wet-foot policy is that other alien was still in the water. The
interpretation found that one had made landfall.‘‖97
Later, in February 2004, eleven Cuban nationals were discovered
floating on the sea in a makeshift raft fashioned from a 1959 Buick
automobile.98 The migrants boarded a Coast Guard vessel while
approximately twenty-five miles offshore of Vaca Key, Marathon,
Florida.99 While the passengers were interviewed as to whether they could
establish a credible fear of persecution in Cuba, the vessel came within
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2153 (1966)).
89. See generally Brown, supra note 64, at 278–80 (discussing the rise in the professional
smuggling of Cubans.)
90. WASEM, supra note 51, at 11.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Id.
93. Talamo, supra note 40, at 717 (citing Yves Colon, Touching Land Defines Who Stays,
Goes, MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 1999, at 15A).
94. Colon, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Id. There are reports of the Coast Guard using pepper spray and even water cannons to
prevent Cubans from making landfall. WASEM, supra note 51, at 16.
97. Colon, supra note 93 (quoting Dan Geoghegan, Assistant Chief of Border Patrol in
Miami).
98. Rodriguez v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
99. Id. at 1243.
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twelve nautical miles of the United States coastline three separate times.100
Three of the passengers were able to establish a credible fear of persecution
and were scheduled for a transfer to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to
undergo a detailed examination.101 Aware of the ―discrepancy in the
percentage of petitions for asylum that are granted for interdicted
passengers compared with the percentage granted for those who have
successfully reached United States soil,‖ the Cubans sought judicial review
of their repatriation while still onboard a Coast Guard vessel in
international waters.102 They based their request for an injunction, inter
alia, on the fact that they entered United States territorial waters three
times aboard the Coast Guard vessel.103 However, the court found that
―mere entry into United States waters‖ was not sufficient ―to accord the
status of applicant for admission‖ and denied the Cubans‘ request for
injunction.104
More recently, in 2006, the Coast Guard discovered fifteen Cuban
migrants on the old Seven Mile Bridge in the Florida Keys.105 Originally
built in 1912, the bridge was dilapidated and completely unconnected to
land in some places.106 The migrants landed on such an unconnected
portion.107 The Coast Guard deemed the bridge ―analogous to a buoy
moored to the bottom of a channel by chain,‖ and therefore reasoned that
the Cubans were not on United States soil and were ―feet wet.‖108 Under
Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy,109 all fifteen Cubans were immediately returned
to Cuba.110
Those who make the treacherous journey across the Florida Straits just
to fail so close to the finish line serve as a lesson to all. Today, more and
more Cubans (or their exile families) are willing to pay upwards of
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1244.
102. Id. at 1243–44.
103. Id. at 1244.
104. Id. at 1245–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Chertoff, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
106. Id. at 1348.
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. The court noted that the Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy entitles Cubans to remain in the
United States just by virtue of setting foot on shore. ―If [Cubans] reach land, they are allowed to
stay, apply for political asylum and eventually residency. If they are picked up at sea, they are
repatriated to Cuba.‖ Id. at 1344–45.
110. Id. at 1345. Back in Cuba, all fifteen migrants filed suit ―seeking (1) a declaratory
judgment for a ‗Judicial definition of the term ‗territory‘ of the United States‘ including whether a
bridge or structure equals presence within the United States, and (2) a declaratory judgment
ordering the return to the United States of the fifteen individuals who were erroneously returned to
Cuba on January 9, 2006.‖ Id. The court denied the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment,
finding that the Coast Guard‘s determination and subsequent repatriation was ―unreasonable‖ and
that ―the migrants should have been considered ‗feet dry.‘‖ Id. at 1349–50. Despite the favorable
ruling, the migrants, now back under Cuban jurisdiction, would not be permitted to leave the island
legally. Id. at 1345.
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$15,000 to be securely placed on United States soil by smugglers.111 It is a
small price to pay for access to the American dream.
B. The Smuggling Statutes—A Congressional Conundrum
The existence of the CAA creates quite the legal quagmire. Congress
has bestowed upon Cuban immigrants the unparalleled right to enter and
remain in the United States.112 But Congress curiously criminalizes the act
of bringing them here.113 Specifically, any person who:
Knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such
person at a place other than a designated port of entry or place
other than as designated by the Commissioner, regardless of
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to
come to, enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of
any future official action which may be taken with respect to
such alien [commits a felony offense.]114
Similarly, a person commits a misdemeanor who,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien
has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter,
or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to
the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien,
regardless of any official action which may later be taken with
respect to such alien.115
The smuggling statutes and the CAA stand in conflict. In practice, the
contradiction of the two policies creates absurd results. Under the current
law, Cubans are welcomed into the country while the boat captains go
straight to jail.116 The outcome is hardly logical. Consider the case of
Miguel Perez (Perez).117

111. Knaub, supra note 1.
112. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
114. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i).
115. Id. § 1324(a)(2).
116. Following the Mariel Boatlifts, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed indictments against 336
defendants for substantive violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, holding that the defendants lacked the
requisite general intent of the smuggling statute and finding ―[n]otably, the defendants in this case
are not the aliens, but rather those owners, captains, and crew members responsible for transporting
the Cuban nationals to the United States.‖ United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1274
(11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussed
more fully infra).
117. Perez, 443 F.3d at 774–75.
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V. PROSECUTION UNDER THE SMUGGLING STATUTE
In July of 2004, Perez and his fishing buddy Juan-Carlos Valdez
happened upon a stalled boat off the coast of Miami.118 The frightened
passengers hailed Perez and told him that their boat was experiencing
engine problems.119 As explanation, they told Perez that they too were on a
fishing trip and lived in Miami.120 Then, they asked if he would take them
to shore—just ―to leave [them] on land.‖121
Two hours later, when Perez docked his boat at Matheson Hammock
Marina in Miami-Dade County, he and Valdez caught the attention of a
Miami-Dade police officer.122 The officer requested to inspect the boat
registration.123 When Perez opened the cabin to retrieve the registration,
the officer spotted the six passengers that Perez had rescued earlier that
day.124 Perez and Valdez were each charged with six counts of bringing
aliens into the United States illegally125 and one count each of conspiring
to bring aliens into the United States illegally.126
Because the officer discovered the Cuban nationals on United States
soil, they were able to avail themselves of the CAA, be paroled into the
country, and were eligible for adjustment to permanent resident status by
July of 2005.127 In fact, during Perez‘s trial, the government presented the
testimony of Yamisleidy Estevez-Galindo, one of the six Cuban nationals
Perez recovered from the stalled boat.128 She testified that she had first
traveled to the Bahamas from Cuba in order to arrange passage to the
United States by boat.129 When the hired smuggling boat broke down, she
and her fellow nationals were able to convince Perez and Valdez to allow
them aboard the fishing boat and bring them ashore.130 Estevez-Galindo
even admitted to carrying her mother‘s Florida driver‘s license, to offer as
proof that she resided in Miami.131 Despite her illegal actions (and the fact
that she tricked Perez into bringing her ashore), Estevez-Galindo was free
to go, and Perez was convicted on all counts.132 It is a ludicrous result.133
118. Id. at 776.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 775.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 774; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006).
126. Perez, 443 F.3d at 774; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii).
127. Perez, 443 F.3d at 775.
128. Id. at 776.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 774.
133. In fact, the Perez conviction for recklessly disregarding the aliens‘ immigration status
mirrors the ludicrous result Judge Peter Fay envisioned in United States v. Zayas-Morales, where
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act
required a general criminal intent showing.
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Suppose instead that Perez did know that the stranded Cubans were
trying to make their way to the United States to take advantage of the
CAA. However, he mistakenly thought that current policy renders Cubans
de facto legal immigrants by virtue of stepping onto United States soil and
understood Cubans, and Cubans alone, to be authorized to seek asylum in
the United States. This notion is entirely plausible and a rather common
misconception amongst the Cuban-American community of South
Florida.134 Because of the ambiguity created by the CAA and the Wet
Foot/Dry Foot policy, the result of a trial with those facts would likely be
just as ludicrous. Consider the possible defenses created by the confusion.
A. Actus Reus Defense
There is no question that Perez brought a group of aliens to ―a place
other than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by
the Commissioner‖ in violation of the felony smuggling statute.135 What is
significant here is that the aliens are Cubans, and there is no designated
port of entry for Cubans. In fact, the INS Commissioner has stipulated that
essentially all places are valid entry ports for Cubans.136 According to the
Meissner Memorandum, ―The policy of the [INS] is that the inadmissibility
ground that is based on an alien‘s having arrived at a place other than a
port of entry does not apply to CAA applicants.‖137 Quite simply, the rules
are different for Cubans. Therefore, Perez could not commit the actus reus
of smuggling a Cuban under 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A) because he did not
bring them to an invalid port of entry.
B. Mens Rea Defense
Suppose instead that Perez is charged under the misdemeanor
statute.138 Arguably, his belief about the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot
policy might negate the requisite mens rea of the crime. Perez certainly did
not know that his passengers were not already United States residents.
Rather, the government might argue that he acted with reckless disregard
Were we to hold that criminal intent is not required, anyone who might rescue an
alien from the sea, bring them to our shores, and deliver them to immigration
officials for proper processing would be subject to prosecution under this statute.
We cannot conceive such an illogical application of this statute.
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982).
134. See supra Part III.A. It is important to distinguish mistake of law from mistake of fact in
this context. Where knowledge of the law is included as an element of the offense, it is a defense to
that charge that the accused did not understand the law. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 425 & n.9 (1985) (finding that the statute in question required ―a showing that the defendant
knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations‖). This should not be confused with a
mistake of law defense. Id. at 426 n.9.
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
136. See Meissner Memorandum, supra note 80.
137. Id.
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
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of the fact. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a person charged under 8
U.S.C. § 1324 acts with reckless disregard if he is ―‗aware of, but
consciously and carelessly ignore[s], facts and circumstances clearly
indicating that the person transported was an alien who had entered or
remained in the United States in violation of law.‘‖139
In his defense, Perez offers the CAA and the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy
as evidence that he understood the policies to grant Cubans official
authorization to legally enter and remain in the United States. What he is
arguing is, in essence, a mistake of fact, and one that negates the requisite
mens rea to convict him of the crime. If Perez‘s belief is correct, the
Cubans have prior authorization to enter the country. If his belief is
incorrect, the prosecution bears the burden of proving whether Perez acted
with reckless disregard by considering the possibility that his
understanding could be erroneous. Anything short of a flawless execution
of this burden would leave the jury with reasonable doubt, enough for
Perez to escape conviction.
Certainly, the government will move to keep the jury from hearing
about the policies, but a court is likely to let the evidence come in. This is
because the evidence is highly relevant140 to the issue of whether Perez
acted with ―reckless disregard of the fact that [the aliens had] not received
prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United
States . . . .‖141 The evidence is therefore admissible, subject, of course, to
the court‘s discretion to exclude it should the court decide that either the
prejudicial nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative
value or that it will confuse the jury.142 In this case, the probative value is
in demonstrating to the jury that Perez‘s subjective belief that the Cubans
were here lawfully had some basis in the law and policy of the United
States. A court is likely to find the evidence admissible because it is
material to an enumerated element of the crime, and there is no other
available evidence which might be offered in place of the policies.
Ultimately, the overall probative value of the evidence cannot be
outweighed by the chance that a jury might become confused as to when
Cuban immigrants are ―legally present‖ in the United States. In fact, any
potential confusion might be remedied with a limiting instruction.143 In all
likelihood, the court would allow the evidence to be presented during trial.
Once admitted, the evidence will likely be presented to a sympathetic
jury.144 Alleged smugglers are typically tried in the jurisdiction in which
they are arrested.145 Because most interdictions occur off the coast of
Miami or the Florida Keys, smuggling trials occur almost exclusively in
139. United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006) (external citation omitted).
140. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence ―means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.‖ FED. R. EVID. 401.
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
142. FED. R. EVID. 403.
143. FED. R. EVID. 105.
144. Brown, supra note 64, at 287–88.
145. Id. at 288.
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South Florida, right in the heart of the Cuban exile community.146 A jury of
the defendant‘s peers selected from this demographic is likely to be rather
sympathetic.147 Once the jury hears about the policies, it will have an
excellent excuse to find that the fisherman did not act in reckless disregard
because he would not have considered that the conventional wisdom might
be legally inaccurate.148 The policies are, after all, rather confusing, and
presently, rather useless.
C. Intent: The Legislative History of the Smuggling Statute
The defenses created by the contradicting policies stand in
contravention to congressional intent.The current misdemeanor smuggling
statute originated in 1986 as a response to the ―Freedom Flotilla‖ that
―carried more than 125,000 undocumented Cuban nationals to the United
States and presented them to INS officials at Key West, Florida, so that the
aliens could apply for political asylum.‖149 The government charged over
three hundred boat owners and crew members with willfully or knowingly
―‗bring[ing] into‘ the United States any alien ‗not duly admitted by an
immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the
United States.‘‖150 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
defendants did not possess the requisite mens rea because they never
intended to commit an illegal act.151
Citing United States v. Zayas-Morales as the catalyst for the
amendment, the House Judiciary Committee noted, ―Of crucial
significance was the fact that the defendants in the case made no effort to
land any undocumented Cubans surreptitiously or evasively, but instead
brought them directly to immigration officers in Key West.‖152 This ruling
opened the figurative floodgate for Cuban-Americans to retrieve their
relatives from Cuba at will. Congress was unsettled by the implications and
worried that, ―As happened during the Mariel episode, the United States
would be forced to expend extraordinary amounts of money and human
resources in processing, monitoring, caring for and giving hearings to
exorbitant numbers of people.‖153 Recognizing that ―[w]ithout the threat of
criminal prosecution, there is no effective way to deter potential
146. Id.
147. Id. at 287. ―Prosecutors must also contend with issues over whether South Florida juries
may be overly sympathetic to smugglers given the high level of criticism of the Government of
Cuba expressed by the community at large.‖ Id.
148. ―As part of its case, the government must prove the defendant conducted himself
‗knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.‘‖ United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d
772, 780 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).
149. United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J.,
concurring).
150. Id. (Korman, J., concurring) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), amended by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)–(2) (1988)).
151. United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 1982).
152. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 66 (1986).
153. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 6

1032

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

transporters from inundating U.S. ports of entry with undocumented
aliens,‖154 Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), which criminalizes
―conduct of the kind at issue in the Mariel ‗Freedom Flotilla‘ cases.‖155
Thus, it is clearly the intent of Congress to dissuade illegal Cuban
migration. The American system simply cannot withstand another influx of
Cuban immigrants. Yet current policy continues to incentivize smuggling
by rewarding Cubans who make it to shore with a green card,156 despite the
erosion of any justification for the policy‘s existence.
VI. HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND MODERN APPLICATIONS
OF THE CAA
A. Historical Justifications of the CAA
Congress enacted the CAA to accomplish four main objectives: (1) to
destabilize the new Communist dictatorship in Florida‘s backyard; (2) to
allow Castro‘s political refugees to enter America with minimal
administrative burdens; (3) to expedite the rate at which new refugees
could enter the American workforce; and (4) to allow Cuban refugees to
apply for permanent residency from within the country.157
1. Cold War Objectives
Castro‘s successful revolution left many ―fear[ing] that Cuba would
undermine the U.S. cold war sphere of influence.‖158 As Soviet weapons
and soldiers poured into Cuba, President John F. Kennedy warned, ―‗We
shall not allow men whose hands are covered with blood from the streets
of Budapest to teach us a lesson in noninterference. Communism in this
hemisphere is not negotiable.‘‖159 The promised interference would be
achieved through immigration policy.
By opening its doors to exile Cubans, the United States began a ―brain
drain‖ of the Cuban labor force.160 The majority of initial immigrants were
well educated and wealthy, among them physicians, professors, and
engineers.161 The world saw the well-publicized ―departure from
Communist Cuba to the democratic United States by refugees . . . [as] a
vote against Communism and a vote for democracy.‖162 The United States
government sought to foster this ―oppressive regime‖ propaganda to ―build
the anti-Communist public sentiment necessary to support expensive Cold
War programs.‖163
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d at 619.
ERLICH, supra note 5, at 64.
Note, supra note 22, at 908.
Id. (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted).
ERLICH, supra note 5, at 25 (quoting President Kennedy).
Note, supra note 22, at 909.
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2. Reducing Red Tape
Once the refugees arrived in the United States, they needed legal
employment. The legislative history of the Act indicates that the CAA was
a necessary device to facilitate the self-sufficiency of the exiles.164 Indeed,
many of the Cubans arriving in the United States were well-educated and
had the potential to contribute to American society.165 Congress reasoned
that if those Cubans were permitted to become permanent residents, ―the
talents and skills of many of the refugees, particularly in the professional
field, which are now going to waste because of State licensing laws will be
put to use in the national interest.‖166
The impediment to permanent residency at the time was an ―awkward
procedure‖ that required applicants living in the United States to leave the
country, apply for an immigrant visa at a United States Consular office
abroad, and then return to the United States after approval as a permanent
resident.167 Because the United States had terminated diplomatic relations
with Cuba, Cuban refugees were obliged to travel to a third country to
apply for their visas.168 In 1966, nearly 165,000 Cubans were living in the
United States without permanent resident status.169 The CAA allowed
those refugees to apply for an adjustment of status without leaving the
country.
B. Modern Applications of the CAA
1. The National Security Loophole
One could hardly imagine that Cuba, with its devastated economy,
continues to be a threat to United States security.170 Having been
abandoned by Soviet troops in 1993, Cuba‘s Revolutionary Armed Forces
is capable of only minimal military endeavors.171 In 1998, a Pentagon
report emerged that concluded that the island ―does not pose a significant
military threat to the United States or other countries in the region.‖172 In
fact, the only threats that the Cuban government currently poses to
American national security are the threats of illegal migration and drug
trafficking,173 both of which might be remedied with a new immigration
policy.
Of note, however, is the threat posed by foreign terrorists who enjoy

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
(2007).
173.

See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1978, at 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.A.N.N. 3792, 3794.
GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 20.
S. REP. NO. 89-1675, at 4 (1966).
Estevez, supra note 17, at 1277.
Id. at 1277–78.
Id. at 1278.
Note, supra note 22, at 911–12.
Id. at 912.
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the support of the Cuban government.174 In 1982, Congress added Cuba to
the State Department‘s list of states sponsoring international terrorism.175
Cuba remains on that list today because many argue that there is ―ample
evidence that Cuba supports terrorism,‖ including ―supporting terrorist acts
and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa‖ and harboring
―members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from
justice.‖176 For example, Cuba openly shelters and supports the ―members
of three terrorist organizations—Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA),
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Columbia‘s
National Liberation Army (ELN).‖177
In a report issued in 2010, the State Department claimed that the
―Cuban government . . . publicly condemned acts of terrorism by alQa‘ida . . . ,‖ but admitted that Cuban officials ―remained critical of the
U.S. approach to combating international terrorism.‖178 While there is no
evidence that Cuba has been used to ―organize, finance, or execute terrorist
acts against the United States,‖179 it is quite possible, most of all because of
the CAA. A terrorist need only infiltrate—or be invited into—Cuba, obtain
fraudulent Cuban identification, and then make his way to the United
States where, under the CAA, he would be permitted to remain
indefinitely.180
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States
implemented new security measures that resulted in a significant drop in
the processing and admission of Cuban nationals. Because of the
difficulties in executing security clearances and background checks, only
305 Cubans legally arrived stateside in 2003.181 Another 7,213
circumvented the security measures by coming to the United States without
documentation and thereafter invoking the CAA.182 Any one of those
thousands of people could have been a terrorist claiming to be a Cuban
refugee. The CAA creates a national security loophole that needs to be
closed.

174.
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176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
In describing the shortfalls of the CAA, Fidel Castro himself pointed out that:
[T]hose who set foot on [American] coasts are automatically welcomed and not
asked to meet any requirements. Individuals with tainted personal records, who
would never receive a visa if they applied, then get the right to immediately start
working and living in that country. Thus, the spirit and letter of the Migratory
Agreements are breached and the assets and safety of Americans are placed in
jeopardy.
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2. Decline of Political Refugees
Gone too are the hordes of political refugees seeking asylum from
Castro‘s regime. Between 1966 and 1973, an average of 38,000 Cubans
entered the United States annually.183 From 1973–1979, those numbers fell
to a mere 5,000 Cuban refugees per year.184 By the early 1970s, Congress
came to realize that the emergency situation that prompted the enactment
of the CAA ―no longer existed.‖185 In opposition to the continued
American-funded airlift program, Senator Allen Ellender, Appropriations
Committee chairman, argued, ―It is time to halt the program, not because
we are against the Cubans, but because they ought to come through the
regular channels. I really believe that we have done enough.‖186
When the Cuban government began to allow exiles back into the
country in 1979, many Miami Cubans returned to their homeland with gifts
for their relatives, symbols of ―the affluence available in the United
States.‖187 As historian Melanie Ziegler speculates, it was perhaps this
opening of the island that reminded Cubans of the ―American dream‖ and
became the catalyst for the Mariel exodus of 1980.188 Within four months,
over 125,000 Marielitos arrived in the United States through the Mariel
Boatlift.189 In contrast to the first two waves of refugees, over 70% of the
Mariel Cubans were ―blue-collar workers.‖190 These were not the same
well-educated Cuban refugees who Congress sought to integrate into the
American labor force.191 Many of them, and their successors, would
become a burden to the American welfare system.192 Moreover, it was
immediately apparent that the Marielitos did not come to the United States
―to escape political persecution or to reunite with their families, but simply
to try their luck in the land of opportunity.‖193
In fact, many of the Mariel Cubans were more criminal deviants than
political dissidents. Castro seized upon the occasion to rid himself of
―undesirables,‖ by opening up prisons and insane asylums so that the
patients and prisoners could make it to a boat.194 Then-Miami Mayor
183. ZIEGLER, supra note 172, at 45.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 45–46.
189. Id. at 48.
190. Id.
191. See supra Part VI.A.2.
192. Note, supra note 22, at 914. Editorials published in the Miami Herald during the late
1970s indicated America‘s frustration with the continuing onslaught of Cuban immigrants. GARCÍA,
supra note 12, at 45. According to García, ―While the editors celebrated the rapid economic
adjustment of the Cuban exiles—whom they called the ‗cream of the nation‘—they voiced the
widespread concern that Cuba‘s cream had already been skimmed, and that the continuing influx of
lower-class Cubans presented an economic burden to the United States.‖ Id. Forty percent of the
Mariel Boatlift-era Cubans made less than $15,000 a year in 1990. SURO, supra note 68, at 172.
193. Note, supra note 22, at 912–13 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted).
194. ERLICH, supra note 5, at 33.
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Maurice Ferre wrote in a letter to the editor of the Miami Herald that the
Cuban government had ―‗flushed these people on to us.‘‖195 The sentiment
was not unfounded. Crime rose 66% in Miami in 1980.196 These
undesirable ―refugees‖ released by Castro made a mockery of the CAA.
The Marielitos could hardly be considered political refugees and neither
can most current CAA applicants.
3. Immediacy of Immigrant Integration
Much of the red tape that existed at the time that Congress enacted the
CAA is likewise no longer an issue. In 1966, there were over 165,000
Cuban refugees living in the United States without permanent resident
status and in need of legal documentation to obtain employment.197 Most
of these refugees had no opportunity to obtain an immigrant visa before
leaving Cuba.198 The current generation, however, is entitled to 20,000
immigrant visas annually through the Joint Communiqué and may apply
for the visa in person in Havana, Cuba.199 This system puts to rest any
panic about integrating large numbers of invited Cubans into the United
States.
4. Current State of U.S.-Cuban Relations
In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), which
stipulates that the CAA will be repealed only when Cuba becomes a
democracy.200 This is nothing more than an expression of excessive
ideological idealism. Congressional decisions, especially those with
international implications, ought to be pragmatic. Rather than preserving
the CAA until a perfect political system comes about in Cuba, Congress
should look to degrees of improvement within Cuba. Factors such as the
independence of the judiciary, the softening of the administration, and the
toleration of enterprise are just as indicative of progress as a transition to
democracy.
Since the passing of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl
Castro, Cuba has made significant changes. As Latin American Affairs
specialist Mark Sullivan points out, in 2008 Cuba signed two United
Nations human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights.201 In March of the same year, the Cuban government

195. GARCÍA, supra note 12, at 70 (quoting Maurice Ferre, Letter to the Editor, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 2, 1983, at 16A).
196. Id. at 71.
197. See supra Part VI.A.2.
198. Note, supra note 22, at 913.
199. Joint Communiqué, supra note 34, at 330.
200. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1966 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 606(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-695 (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18, and 28 U.S.C.).
201. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 7.
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began allowing Cubans to stay at tourist hotels.202 Just recently, the Cuban
government began allowing the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco), a
group of women who rally for the release of political prisoners, to conduct
weekly demonstrations in Havana.203 On March 23, 2011, the Cuban
government released the last two remaining imprisoned members of the
―Group of 75,‖ a faction of democracy activists arrested in 2003.204 In fact,
there has been a sharp decline in the number of political prisoners since
2006 when Raúl Castro came to power.205 That year, there were 333
prisoners, 283 by 2007, 205 in 2009, and 167 in July 2010.206 There are
now reportedly only sixty political prisoners remaining.207
Just this March, Fidel Castro stepped down from his position as leader
of the Cuban Communist Party.208 This momentous occurrence may signify
the end of the Castro era. In further effort to cleanse the Cuban political
system of the old guard, President Raúl Castro proposed in the same month
that elected officials serve no more than two five-year terms.209 Blaming
his generation for failing to cultivate young leaders, President Castro
recognized the need for a ―‗systematic rejuvenation of the whole chain of
party and administrative posts‘‖ during his opening speech at the Sixth
Communist Party Congress.210 Days later, Fidel Castro endorsed his
brother‘s speech, writing in the Cuban state-run newspaper Granma, ―‗The
new generation is called upon to rectify and change without hesitation all
that needs to be corrected and changed . . . .‘‖211 Also notable is the recent
expansion of private enterprise. By late 2010, over 157,000 Cubans were
self-employed and by early 2011, approximately 113,000 had received
licenses to work independently.212 At the April Congress meeting,
President Castro reported that his government had licensed 180,000 small
businesses ―with tens of thousands more expected to be issued in the
coming months.‖213 The New York Times heralded this progress as possibly
202. Id.
203. Id. at 9.
204. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 9–10
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41617.pdf. During a crackdown in March
2003 (a period sometimes referred to as Primavera Negra, or Black Spring), the Cuban government
imprisoned seventy-five democracy activists, a group which included independent journalists,
leaders of labor unions and opposition parties, and librarians. Id. at 9. The majority of the group
remained incarcerated until mid-2010. Id.
205. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 10.
206. Id.
207. SULLIVAN, supra note 204, at 10.
208. Randal C. Archibold, Cuban Leader Proposes Term Limits in Sign of New Era, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/world/americas/17cuba.html.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Raul Castro).
211. Sara Miller Llana, As Fidel Castro Steps Down, a Political Shakeup in Cuba?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 19, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110419/wl_csm/377988_1 (external
citation omitted).
212. SULLIVAN, supra note 204, at 15.
213. Archibold, supra note 208.
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―the most significant changes [in Cuba] since businesses were nationalized
in 1968 . . . .‖214
The Bush Administration indicated in May 2002 that Congress would
consider lifting the embargo ―if Cuba was prepared to free political
prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent
organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair
elections.‖215 It would seem that much of this has already occurred, and the
time has come for the United States government to consider a moderated
policy. Indeed, many argue that if the United States would alter current
policy, ―then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate
and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island.‖216 Sanctions
against Cuba, which include an immigration policy designed to cripple the
government, must give way in order for Cuba to effect change.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Congress noted in 1971, the emergency that prompted the CAA is
over.217 But rather than repeal the antiquated and gratuitous Act, the United
States government sought to circumvent the windfall of the CAA by
making access to its benefits contingent upon location. Thus, the Wet
Foot/Dry Foot policy stands in contravention to the CAA. If Cubans are
entitled to automatic political asylum, it is irrational that receipt of that
asylum should be contingent on whether an applicant is standing on United
States soil or on a Coast Guard vessel. The fact that Wet Foot/Dry Foot
policy even exists demonstrates that the CAA is merely a Cold War vestige
and no longer needed.
―[T]he contradictions inherent in the ‗wet-foot, dry-foot policy‘‖ are
directly responsible for the ―increase in human smuggling‖ cases since
1995.218 Today, nearly all Cubans who enter the United States via boat are
―doing so as part of human smuggling rings.‖219 Worse still, the confusing
policies create defenses to the crime of smuggling a Cuban national that
are in conflict with Congress‘ intent to stop illegal Cuban immigration.
This is not news to Congress. In 2009, Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking
member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, circulated a staff report
suggesting an executive branch review of the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy.220
According to the staff report, that ―review should assess whether [the]
policy has led to the inefficient use of U.S. Coast Guard resources and
assets as well as the potential to redirect these resources to drug
interdiction efforts.‖221
Despite awareness, no action has been taken. As the 1986 House
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Report warned, failure to deter migration will result in the United States
being ―forced to expend extraordinary amounts of money and human
resources in processing, monitoring, caring for and giving hearings to
exorbitant numbers of people.‖222 Furthermore, the CAA results in a very
real threat to national security by creating a loophole for terrorists to enter
into and remain in the United States. To avoid these results, Congress
should sunset the CAA and Cubans ―‗ought to come through the regular
channels.‘‖223

222. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at I (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.N.N 5649, 5670.
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